Board Issues Written Decision Denying IR Request

Trustees of the California State University (East Bay) (2013) PERB Decision No. I056-H (Issued 6/07/13) 

PERB has issued a rare written decision denying an Injunctive Relief (IR) request.  The IR request came from a CSU professor who alleged that he was terminated from employment for filing numerous grievances.  The employee sought IR because of the professional damage, and the financial and emotional distress caused by his unemployment.  This was the employee’s fifth request for IR in this case.

In a short decision, the Board examined the IR request under the Modesto standards.  The Board assumed that the first prong of Modesto—reasonable cause to believe that an unfair practice has occurred—was satisfied since a complaint had issued.  As for the second prong—whether IR is just and proper—the Board emphasized that IR is warranted only in circumstances where the Board’s order would be rendered meaningless absent IR.  The Board affirmed its long-standing holding that financial damages caused by a termination generally do not meet this standard since those damages can be awarded later.  The Board also held that since it does not have the authority to award emotional distress damages, such damages cannot constitute the necessary irreparable harm under the just and proper prong.

Comments:

  1. To my knowledge, this is the first formal written decision in an IR case since 2001, when the Board issued County of San Joaquin (Health Care Services) (2001) PERB Decision No. I055-M.  Since that time, decisions to grant or deny IR have been transmitted in a very short letter from the Office of the General Counsel advising the parties of the Board’s decision.  Those transmittal letters do not set forth the Board’s reasons for granting or denying an IR request.
  2. So why did the Board finally issue a formal written IR decision?  Reading between the lines, I do not think the Board was trying to set forth a new legal principle.  Instead, I think the Board was faced with its fifth IR request in this case and wanted to provide the charging party some sense of why the requests were denied, and perhaps more importantly, signal to the charging party that future requests will also be denied absent some changed circumstance.
  3. Interestingly, this decision was issued “per curiam” which is Latin for “by the court.” Per curiam decisions do not list a Board member as the author.  In the past, the Board used the per curiam designation much more often, typically in decisions responding to a motion or some other matter requiring the quick attention of the Board.  Based on some quick research, I think the last decision issued per curiam was back in 1990.  So it’s a practice that the Board has not used in a very long time that this current Board is apparently bringing back.
  4. One last note, here the Board assumed that the first prong of Modesto—reasonable cause to believe an unfair practice has occurred—was satisfied because a complaint issued.  There are some PERB cases holding that the “reasonable cause” standard under Modesto is a higher standard than merely stating a prima facie case.  (See Fremont Unified School Dist. (1990) PERB Decision No. IR-54; San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist. (1984) PERB Decision No. IR-46.)  However, given the nature of this decision and the fact that it was issued per curiam, I do not think the Board intended to deviate from the prior cases discussing reasonable cause.  Instead, I think the Board was just trying to get to the second prong of Modesto quickly since that’s the heart of the decision.
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Court: Access to IA File Before Interview Not Within Scope

Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Orange (Court of Appeal Case No. G047167) (Issued on 6/12/13)

The Orange County Sheriff’s Department (Department) had a past practice of allowing an officer under investigation to view the Department’s internal affairs (IA) file before his or her interview by an investigator. Asserting that this practice hindered investigations and was inconsistent with best practices, the Department unilaterally stopped the practice. The union representing deputy sheriffs then brought this unfair practice charge in superior court.

In its decision, the court held that the Department’s order delaying access to the IA files until after the investigative interview was within its legal authority and not subject to the “meet and confer” requirements of the MMBA. The court noted that its decision addressed a question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564. That issue is whether a long-standing past practice constitutes a working condition within the meaning of the MMBA. The court held that it does not unless that past practice significantly affects wages, hours, or working conditions.

Comments:

  1. It terms of its legal holding, this decision is not a surprise. The issue addressed by the Court is whether changing a past practice triggers the meet and confer obligation under the MMBA. The Court held that it does not unless the past practice significantly affects wages, hours, or working conditions. In labor parlance, the Court held that a change in past practice is not subject to meet and confer unless the past practice involves an issue within the scope of bargaining. That has always been the rule under PERB precedent. So this decision really shouldn’t surprise labor practitioners.
  2. However, I found the decision fascinating for another reason. I think this case illustrates how the balancing test under Claremont can evolve as public policy concerns change over time. In other words, under the Claremont balancing test, an issue that was found to be within scope in the past might not be found within scope today because of public policy concerns. In my opinion, this case is such an example.
  3. One of the cases cited in the decision is Long Beach Police Officer Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 996. In Long Beach, the court held that a past practice of allowing officers involved in a shooting to consult with an attorney or representative prior to making a report was a matter within the scope of bargaining under the MMBA. The court in Long Beach characterized the competing interests as follows:  “On the other hand, the practice in question is directed at an act of force which has already occurred. The difference in timing of the act of force is crucial. Public safety is no longer directly at issue after an incident has occurred. The main thrust of appellants’ contention is that the Department and the public have the right to know the true circumstances of the incident without the possible taint from the advice of others. The public policy question is whether the officers’ rights are superior to the right of the Department and the public to know the so-called ‘true’ circumstances of the incident.” The court eventually concluded that the public’s right to know did not outweigh the benefits of collective bargaining. The court in Long Beach also acknowledged that, “Although appellants correctly urge that the situation is ripe for potential abuse, we cannot presume that abuse will occur.”
  4. If you apply the reasoning in Long Beach to the facts here, there is a strong argument that you would conclude that the Department’s past practice is within the scope of bargaining. But in the area of police accountability, a lot has changed since 1984 when the Long Beach case was issued. The Rodney King beating in 1991 fundamentally changed public perceptions. That incident gave rise to the Christopher Commission. One of the major reforms recommended by the Christopher Commission was the creation of the Office of the Inspector General for the LAPD. The State of California now also has an Office of the Inspector General to safeguard the state’s correctional system.  So in 1984, police accountability was not a huge public concern.  It sure is today.
  5. Given what has happened since 1984, I’m not sure a court today would reach the same decision as the court in Long Beach.  Indeed, I would argue that this decision suggests that the Long Beach decision is out-of-synch with public policy.  I think this court gave a lot more consideration to the right of “the public to know the so-called ‘true’ circumstances of the incident” than did the court in Long Beach.  And I think that’s a good thing.
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PERB Holds Oral Argument in City of Lompoc Case

City of Lompoc v. Lompoc Police Officers Association; Lompoc Police Officers Association v. City of Lompoc (PERB Case Nos. LA-CO-100-M; LA-CE-555-M; LA-CE-564-M; LA-CE-585-M)

Today, PERB held its first oral argument in a case since 2004.  All four Board members were in attendance.  The issue before the Board was whether PERB has authority to issue a remedial order in a case involving a “mixed” bargaining unit that includes non-peace officers and peace officers.  Arguing for the union was Michael Morguess of Lackie, Dammeier, McGill, & Ethir.  Arguing for the City was Adrianna Guzman of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore.

Each side was allotted 30 minutes to argue, which included time for questions by Board Members.  The union, as the party bringing exceptions to a proposed decision, was given the opportunity to reserve some of the 30 minutes for rebuttal.

Mr. Morguess argued for an “all or nothing” approach; namely, that everyone in a mixed unit should be subject to PERB’s jurisdiction.  Such an approach would prevent forum-shopping, according to Mr. Morguess since peace officers would also be required to go to PERB.  After his presentation, the Board members quickly jumped in with questions.  Chairwoman Martinez noted that both the Claremont and Rialto court cases involved mixed units.  She asked why those cases proceeded in court if the entire mixed unit is subject to PERB’s jurisdiction.  Board Member Winslow chimed in and noted that the situation in Claremont and Rialto suggested that forum shopping was possible.  Member Banks asked about situations where individual peace officers might have a claim.  He questioned whether peace officer employees could go to court even if the “bargaining unit” went to PERB.  Mr. Morguess admitted that situation could occur.  Member Huguenin asked both parties how prevalent are mixed units under the MMBA.  Both the union and city stated that such units are “not uncommon” (I agree) but didn’t have specifics.  Finally, Member Winslow asked why couldn’t the peace officers just go to court while the non-peace officers went to PERB.  Mr. Morguess responded that such a system would be costly for both unions and employers and lead to potentially conflicting results.  Ms. Winslow noted that that might be the natural result of the crave-out created by Government Code 3511 which exempts peace officers from PERB.

Ms. Guzman similarly laid out the City’s position quickly and left plenty of room for questions by the Board.  She argued that while PERB has jurisdiction over unfair charges brought by the union in a mixed-unit, PERB could not order a remedy for the peace officers in that unit.  Member Winslow noted that such a holding would allow PERB jurisdiction over liability, but not the remedy, to which Ms. Guzman agreed.  However, Board Members questioned whether a bright line really exists between liability and remedy.  Member Huguenin pressed this point by asking if PERB could just order a remedy for the union (for example, a lump sum of money to be distributed as the union sees fit), instead of ordering individual remedies.  Ms. Guzman stated that PERB could not do that if the remedy to the union was based on individual calculations.  Ms. Guzman also agreed with Member Winslow that the Government Code section 3511 only states that “persons” who are peace officers are excluded and does not use the term “employee organizations.”  Member Banks made the point that if the rules for peace officers and non-peace officers are different, there may be no benefit to being in a mixed-unit.  Member Banks also pressed home the point that it’s not always easy to distinguish between an “individual” claim versus a “union claim” since some individual claims involve the entire unit.

The oral argument began at 2:00 pm and ended at 2:55 pm.

Comments:

As a PERB “junkie” I truly enjoyed watching the oral argument.  I was also there when PERB last held an oral argument in 2004.  My hope is that this Board will schedule more cases for oral argument in the future and make the practice much more common.  If they do, here are some observations for anyone arguing before the Board:

  1. Leave time for questions.  The Board provided each side 30 minutes to argue.  Both the union and city wisely chose to use only about half that time to argue and leave the rest for questions.
  2. Be prepared for tough questions.  All the Board members were extremely prepared and engaged.  The thing that stood out to me was that every Board member participated in the oral argument.  Each had tough questions to ask.  Remember, this is a Board where all the members have a background in labor relations.  So be prepared for tough questions.
  3. Don’t be afraid to make policy arguments.  This was a case where there just wasn’t much law or legislative history.  So both sides made a point to raise public policy considerations.  The Board clearly is concerned about the labor relations framework in California and takes its responsibilities seriously.  My feeling is that PERB is only going to grant oral argument in cases where there are policy ramifications.  So I think it was wise for both sides to have addressed policy matters.
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PERB Grants IR in City of Fremont Case

Public Employment Relations Board (SEIU Local 1021) v. City of Fremont (Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG13677821) (PERB Case No. SF-CE-1028-M)

PERB recently granted a request for injunctive relief (IR) filed by SEIU Local 1021 against the City of Fremont (City).  The case began when a bargaining unit employee submitted a petition, with the required proof of support, seeking to decertify SEIU.  The City accepted the petition and began preparing to hold a decertification election.  Shortly thereafter, the City concluded that the official recognized employee organization was the Fremont City Employees Association (FACE), and not SEIU; and that FACE was merely affiliated with SEIU.  Based on this fact, the City sent the petitioner a letter concluding that the City’s decertification procedures were not applicable and that the appropriate procedure would be for FACE to seek disaffiliation from SEIU.  That employee subsequently notified the City that FACE had conducted an internal election to disaffiliate from SEIU.  However, the City then received a letter from FACE stating that no election had taken place and that FACE remained affiliated with SEIU.  Faced with these completing claims, the City stopped bargaining with SEIU and withheld dues to SEIU until the dispute was resolved.

SEIU filed an unfair practice charge and requested IR.  PERB granted the IR request.  In arguing that there was reasonable cause to believe an unfair practice had occurred, PERB cited to the following actions by the City: 1) improperly processing the decertification petition; 2) failing to arrange for a neutral third party to conduct the decertification election; 3) unlawfully assisting the employee by providing legal advice; 4) refusing to bargain with SEIU and withholding dues; and 5) violating its duty of neutrality by expressing support for FACE over SEIU.

As for irreparable harm, PERB argued that the City had essentially “locked out” SEIU and that the purposes of the MMBA would be subverted without IR.  PERB asserted that the failure to bargain in good faith has long been understood as likely causing irreparable injury to the union.  Even if monetary relief could be awarded, employees could not be made whole for the value of the right to enjoy union representation, according to PERB.

PERB filed its complaint and requested a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on May 1, 2013.  The superior court granted the TRO on May 7, 2013.

Comments:

  1. Because they are so rare, every IR granted by PERB is worth examining.  Most IR’s granted by PERB involve either: 1) an election, or 2) a health and safety issue.  The election cases typically involve some organizational effort that, without prompt injunctive relief, would be rendered meaningless with the passage of time.  This case is somewhat unique in that the City did not appear to be moving ahead with an election, but rather trying to maintain the status quo in the face of a potential question concerning representation (QCR).
  2. In terms of ”reasonable cause” for the TRO, I want to comment on 2 of the 5 alleged unfair practices.  First, PERB alleged that the City committed an unfair practice by failing to arrange for a neutral third party to conduct the decertification election.  PERB alleged that because the City included a “no representation” option on the ballot that the City inserted itself as an interested party in the election and therefore was not a “neutral” party.  This is one area where PERB caselaw is sparse.  MMBA section 3507.1(c) does require a neutral third party to be involved in most determinations for exclusive or majority representation.  At least on its face, section 3507.1 does not apply to severance or decertification elections.  So it appears that the Office of the General Counsel has taken the position that the “neutral party” requirement for conducting elections should be extended to decertification elections.
  3. Most local rules already call for the use of a neutral third party, like the State Mediation and Conciliation Service (SMCS), to conduct elections.  So PERB’s position shouldn’t have much of a practical effect on most employers.  I will note that it used to be SMCS’ position that it would not conduct an election if one of the parties objected.  So here, if SEIU asserted that the decertification election was improper, it’s not clear to me that SMCS would have agreed to conduct the election.  However, although SMCS is the most popular election service in the public sector, there are other “neutral” parties that can be contracted to conduct an election.
  4. Now that the State Mediation and Conciliation Service (SMCS) is part of PERB, PERB is promulgating regulations to govern elections conducted by SMCS in MMBA jurisdictions.  My understanding is that SMCS does not intend to charge for this service (which they do now).  If having SMCS conduct an election is going to be free, that seems like a great option to me.
  5. Second, PERB alleged that the City improperly gave the petitioner legal advice.  PERB suggested that merely pointing out technical deficiencies would have been fine.  However, PERB alleged that the City went too far by opining that disaffiliation, not decertification, was the appropriate procedure and suggesting that it supported the disaffiliation effort.  This caught my attention because PERB is drawing a very fine line for employers to walk.  It can easily trap the unwary.  Here, my initial thought was that it was reasonable for the City to explain to the petitioner why disaffiliation, and not decertification, was appropriate in this situation.  It seems to me the City was just explaining its local rules to an interested party.  However, together with other actions by the City, PERB felt this went too far.  So an employer faced with such a situation will want to be very careful in its communications with any party.
  6. Finally, it’s worth pointing out that PERB has taken a very aggressive stance here in terms of irreparable harm.  Here, there is no organizing effort to protect.  Rather, the City felt it needed to maintain the status quo in the face of a QCR.  Obviously, PERB did not believe there was a QCR.  But still, it’s an aggressive stance to take that the mere delay in bargaining constitutes irreparable harm.  I wonder if this might signal a more aggressive use of the IR process by PERB in the coming years.
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Supreme Court: Unions Have Right to Employee Addresses

County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (Cal. Supreme Court Case No. S191944) (Issued on 5/30/13)

The California Supreme Court has finally issued its decision in this case. The issue is one of first impression: whether California’s constitutional right of privacy limits a union’s ability to obtain the home addresses of bargaining unit members from the employer.

Facts

SEIU represents several bargaining units in the County of Los Angeles. As of 2007, SEIU had contact information for approximately 46,000 union members but did not have that information for about half of the 14,500 non-union members in the various bargaining units. Historically, the parties’ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) required that SEIU provide its Hudson notice to the County Employee Relations Commission which would then mail the notice to all bargaining unit members. During negotiations in 2006, SEIU proposed changing the MOU to require the County to provide home addresses for all bargaining unit members directly to SEIU. The County refused. One of the arguments raised by the County was that non-members have a constitutional right to privacy which outweighed any need by SEIU for the information.

Court Decision

The Supreme Court rejected the County’s argument. First, the Court held that under the MMBA, employee contact information is presumptively relevant. In making this holding the Court relied heavily on NLRB and PERB precedent. Because PERB is the expert agency in the field of public sector labor relations, the Court stated that it would follow PERB precedent unless it is “clearly erroneous.” Under PERB’s decision in Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2004) PERB Dec. No. 1704-M, employee contact information must be disclosed absent a compelling need for privacy because such information is necessary to allow the union to communicate with employees.  Therefore the burden was on the County to demonstrate why the contact information should not be provided to SEIU.

Next, the Court considered whether California’s constitutional right to privacy affected the SEIU’s right to employee contact information under the MMBA. To decide this issue the Court applied the balancing test set forth in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1. Applying that test, the Court held that employees do have a legally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in their home contact information. However, the Court held that providing home contact information to a union was not a serious invasion of that privacy and that the balance of interests favored disclosure. Accordingly, the Court concluded that:

[A]lthough the County’s employees have a cognizable privacy interest in their home addresses and telephone numbers, the balance of interests strongly favors disclosure of this information to the union that represents them. Procedures may be developed for employees who object to this disclosure.

However, the Court also cautioned that:

“Although we have concluded that a balancing of interests generally favors disclosure, this balance might, in some cases, tip in favor of privacy when an individual employee objects and demands that home contact information be withheld.” (Emphasis added.)

In terms of what procedures can be developed, the Court rejected the lower courts order that the County utilize an opt-out procedure modeled after civil class actions. Instead, the Court held that the development of such procedures should be left to the employers and unions.

Comments:

  1. This is a clear victory for PERB. There was a question in my mind about how much consideration a court would give to a PERB decision in a case where PERB was not directly involved (for example, a case involving peace officers or the City/County of Los Angeles). The answer is quite a lot. Here, even though PERB did not issue the decision being contested, the Court deferred to PERB precedent. It will be interesting to see if this decision prompts the groups—particularly the cops—still not under PERB’s jurisdiction to reconsider whether they should be. After all, if you’re going to be bound by PERB precedent wouldn’t you want some opportunity to influence it?
  2. This decision appears to allow for procedural safeguards to protect employee privacy rights but does not specify what those safeguards might be. The Court mentions that safeguards can be bargained between the employer and union. That’s obviously true. But let’s say you can’t reach agreement with the union. Can you impose a set of procedural safeguards? Or can you adopt a local rule that sets forth procedural safeguards? Under the MMBA, any local rule must be reasonable. But that just begs the question of what is reasonable under this decision.
  3. In my humble opinion, any reasonable local rule would have to incorporate an opt-out system, as opposed to an opt-in system. This is because the Court has made it clear that there is a strong presumption that the union is entitled to employee contact information. Indeed, the Court strongly suggests that any assertion of privacy must be initiated by the employee, and not the employer. Even with an opt-out system (for example, allowing an employee to check a box on a form asking the employer not to share the home address with the union) there is a question in my mind whether the employee must articulate some specific reason for opting out. For example, the Court mentioned that fear of harassment might be a concern.  So must the employee cite to a concern, like harassment, or is checking off a box sufficient?  It’s not clear.
  4. All-in-all, while this decision provides guidance on how a union’s right to contact bargaining unit members intersects with the right of privacy, it does not address how these principles are to be implemented in the real world. So there will still be some growing pains in this area going forward.
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